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Several common neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder, Tourette syndrome (TS), autistic
spectrum disorder) are associated with unpleasant bodily sensations that are perceived as an urge for action.
Similarly, many of our everyday behaviors are also characterized by bodily sensations that we experience as
urges for action. Where do these urges originate? In this paper, we consider the nature and the functional anatomy
of “urges-for-action,” both in the context of everyday behaviors such as yawning, swallowing, and micturition, and
in relation to clinical disorders in which the urge-for-action is considered pathological and substantially interferes
with activities of daily living (e.g., TS). We review previous frameworks for thinking about behavioral urges and
demonstrate that there is considerable overlap between the functional anatomy of urges associated with everyday
behaviors such as swallowing, yawning, and micturition, and those urges associated with the generation of tics in
TS. Specifically, we show that the limbic sensory and motor regions––insula and mid-cingulate cortex––are
common to all of these behaviors, and we argue that this “motivation-for-action” network should be considered
distinct from an “intentional action” network, associated with regions ofpremotor and parietal cortex,which maybe
responsible for the perception of “willed intention” during the execution of goal-directed actions.
Keywords: Urge; Urge-for-action; Habit; Insula; Tourette syndrome; Action.
Many of our everyday behaviors are characterized by
bodilysensationsthatweexperienceeitherasanurgeor
a desire for action. For instance, we may experience a
sensation that our bladder is full that is accompanied, to
a greater or lesser extent, by an urge or desire to urinate
(micturate). In extreme cases, this sense of fullness can
be quite uncomfortable and the urge to urinate can be
hard to suppress. Similarly, we may experience a tickle
inourthroatthatisassociatedwithanurgetocoughorto
swallowthatcanalsobedifficulttosuppressvoluntarily.
However, not all urges for action are necessarily pre-
ceded by bodily sensations of which we are aware. For
example, we may suddenly experience a strong urge to
yawn, or even find ourselves yawning, without being
aware of a sensory “trigger” for the action. In this paper,
we consider the nature and the functional anatomy of
these “urges-for-action,”bothinthecontextofeveryday
behaviors such as yawning, swallowing, and urinating,
and in relation to clinical disorders in which the urge-
for-action is considered pathological and substantially
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syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, addiction).
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE
URGE-FOR-ACTION
In common usage, the terms “urge” and “desire” are
frequently encountered as both a verb (as in to “urge
someone on”––i.e., to motivate, impel, or stimulate a
persontowardanaction)andasanoun(asin“hefeltan
urge to shout”––i.e., a force, drive, or impulse that
impels toward a goal). Furthermore, these terms are
often used interchangeably with one another, and are
frequently listed as synonyms.
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that there is an
important distinction to be made between urges and
desires (e.g., Cameron, 2002; Davenport, 2008). Thus,
Cameron (2002), when discussing interoception, and the
relationship between conscious awareness and visceral
events, makes a distinction between “detection,” which
is an organism’s reflexive response based solely upon
afferent physiological information, and “perception,”
w h i c hr e f e r st oa no r g a n i s m ’s response based upon all
information available to the organism (which might
include learned information and expectations that might
begeneratedasaresultoflearning).Similarly,Davenport,
whendiscussingmechanismsassociatedwiththeurge-to-
cough, defines an urge as a physical need to respond to a
sensorystimulus,andadesireasthetranslationof anurge
into what he refers to as “a central neural targeted goal”
(Davenport, Sapienza, & Bolser, 2002). Davenport’s
motivation-to-action model is presented in Figure 1.
Combiningthesetwoideaswemight concludethat
an urge––as in a drive for action––need not enter
conscious awareness, but that we are always aware
of our desires. An example might help make this
distinction clearer. Imagine that you are driving your
car and you suddenly become aware of an uncomfor-
table sensation that your bladder is full, which you
experience as the urge to urinate. Given that you can
inalllikelihoodcontrolthisurge,youmaythenforma
desire to urinate in which you construct a goal or plan
which includes a representation of the behaviors
required to complete the action (e.g., remembering
that you passed a filling station a mile back and
knowing that filling stations usually have public toi-
lets) and a representation of the likely outcomes of the
action. Can an urge exist if we are not aware of it?
What factors determine whether an urge enters aware-
ness?How is anurgetoact different from an intention
to act? These issues are discussed below.
ARE URGES SIMPLY REFLEXES?
As outlined above, urges are often defined as the drives
or impulses that impel us to act. Nevertheless, it is
argued that actions can, and frequently do, occur in the
absence of any awareness of such drivers, as in the case
where one finds oneself yawning without previously
beingawareofeitherthe desiretoyawnorofany bodily
sensation that might reasonably be identified as giving
rise to the yawn. Instead, one simply finds oneself
yawning. In this case, it might be argued that this is a
reflexive behavior and not an urge-for-action.
One possible distinguishing feature of urges, as dis-
tinct from reflexes, may be that urges are chiefly asso-
ciated with actions that cannot be realized immediately
andmustbeheldincheckuntilanappropriatetimewhen
they might be released. For instance, when we become
aware of having a full bladder, we experience an “urge-
to-void” because wedonot simplyvoidour bladder, but
instead employ a coordinated set of central, autonomic,
and peripheral neural mechanisms to withhold micturi-
tion until we are in an appropriate behavioral context.
Similarly, in the case of yawning, we might define the
urge-to-yawn as arising in circumstances where we are
forcedtotrytostifletheyawnratherthaninthesituation
where we find that we are yawning.
HOW ARE URGES RELATED
TO AWARENESS?
One factor that may determine whether an urge enters
awareness is the intensity of the physiological afferent.
Figure 1. Themotivation-for-actionmodelproposedbyDavenport
to account for the urge to cough (adapted from Davenport, Sapienza,
& Bolser, 2002).
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cough that the perceived strength of the urge that is
experienced is related to the intensity of stimulation.
Specifically, when capsaicin is added to the breathing
circuit, it results in a sensation that is perceived as an
urge-to-cough. Furthermore, increasing capsaicin
levels leads to a reliable increase in estimates of this
urge(Davenport, Sapienza, & Bolser, 2002). Similarly,
in our own unpublished studies of the effects of oro-
pharyngeal stimulation on the urge-to-swallow, we
have found that oropharyngeal stimulation using
pulses of air produces both an urge-to-swallow and
overt swallowing (for similar findings, see also
Lowell et al., 2008). More importantly, we have
found that increasing the intensity of oropharyngeal
stimulation leads to an increase in the strength of the
perceived urge-to-swallow. An important question
therefore concerns the role of awareness, and by impli-
cation “desire,” in the initiation of urge-related actions.
According to the motivation-to-action model repre-
sented in Figure 1, actions are initiated only after a
desire to perform an action has been formed. However,
we do not see this step as necessary and would amend
this model, so as to allow for actions to be initiated
directly, without the need to first construct an explicit
“desire for action.” Two factors motivate this amend-
ment. First, it strikes us that in many instances actions
(e.g., yawning) can be triggered without our necessarily
being aware of any explicit desire. Second, in many
clinical conditions (e.g., Tourette syndrome), as we
shall see below, unwanted actions or behaviors, which
individuals struggle actively to suppress, are neverthe-
less preceded by strong premonitionary urges. In our
view, it isdifficult to reconcile the concept of a “desire,”
which is often defined as “a longing or craving for
something that brings satisfaction or enjoyment,” with
unwantedactions,theexecutionofwhichisexperienced
as unpleasant and distressing.
Ifweacceptthepremiseoutlinedabovethaturges-for-
actionareoftenaccompaniedbybodilysensations,thenit
strikes us that an important distinction can be drawn
between being aware of a bodily sensation and being
aware of an urge-for-action. This distinction can be best
illustrated by considering the following examples. In the
case of an itch, we may be aware of experiencing both an
itch (bodily sensation) and an urge to scratch the itch
(urge-for-action). By contrast, while we may become
aware of an urge-to-yawn, it is not entirely clear that we
areeverawareofthebodilysensationthatgivesrisetothe
urge to yawn. Furthermore, this becomes more important
ifweaccepttheargumentoutlinedabovethaturges occur
primarily in circumstances in which actions may need to
besuppressedortheirexecutiondeferred.Insuchcircum-
stances, we might distinguish between suppression of the
action associated with the urge-for-action, or suppression
of the bodily sensation giving rise to the urge. This dis-
tinction has important clinical implications (see below),
and an interesting issue for future research will be to
determine whether the suppression of bodily sensations
and the suppression of urges-for-action differ in terms of
their functional anatomy.
HOW IS AN URGE TO ACT DIFFERENT
FROM AN INTENTION TO ACT?
The kinds of actions that we have considered as repre-
sentative of urges-for-action are highly automatic,
habitual responses that occur primarily in response to
sensory stimulation. These might include brushing an
insect off your arm, scratching an itch, yawning when
tired, coughing in response to a tickle in your throat,
etc. While such actions can, in some circumstances, be
executed with little or no awareness of the sensory
stimulation that triggered the action, as when one
finds oneself yawning or coughing, we have argued
that a key characteristic of urges-for-action is that they
involvethesuppressionordefermentofanaction.Such
actions might therefore be contrasted to intentional,
goal-directed, forms of action.
The circumstances in which the “willed intention” to
execute an action can be shown to follow the brain
processes involved in the preparation for action were
famously studied by Benjamin Libet (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983), and more recently by Patrick
Haggard and colleagues (e.g., Haggard, 2005; Haggard
& Eimer, 1999; Sirigu et al., 2004). In Libet’st a s k ,
participants fixated on a time-varying, rotating visual
spotandwereinstructedtomakeavoluntaryhandmove-
mentwhenevertheyfeltthe“urge”todoso.Participants
were asked to indicate the location occupied by the
moving spot when they had first felt the urge to move
their hand. Libet showed that this “Wj u d g m e n t ”
occurred some 200 ms prior to movement onset, but,
more importantly, he also showed that the preparatory
brain activity that precedes voluntary action, the so-
called“readinesspotential,”itselfprecededthe“Wjudg-
ment” by several hundred milliseconds. Such readiness
potentialsariseinthepremotorregionsofcortex,includ-
ing both the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the
presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA), regions that
have been linked to the planning and preparation of
intentional, goal-directed, actions and sequences of
actions (Deecke & Kornhuber, 1978).
Haggardhasarguedthatconsciousawarenessofour
intention to act arises during the preparatory processes
that precede an action, and is linked to the joint activity
of premotor and parietal brain areas (Haggard, 2005).
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damage to the parietal cortex show a specific impair-
ment in reporting when they became aware of their
intention to move (i.e., Libet’s “W judgment”). The
proposal that the parietal cortex may maintain a dyna-
mically updated state estimate of the current postural
configuration of the body (the body schema) is well
supported by neuropsychological (e.g., Wolpert,
Goodbody, & Husain, 1998) and recent fMRI studies
(e.g., Parkinson, Condon, & Jackson, 2010; Pellijeff,
Bonilha, Morgan, McKenzie, & Jackson, 2006).
While it is clearly the case that in such experiments
individuals can report when they first perceived them-
selves to have formed an “intention” to move, it is
another thing entirely to argue that such conscious
“intentions” typically precede everyday actions. Thus,
when I am sitting at my desk typing and I break off to
reach for my coffee cup I am not aware of forming an
intention prior to each keystroke that I make or of
forming an intention to reach for my coffee. Instead, I
amawareoftheactionsIammaking.Similarly,whileit
isclearlydemonstrated thatouractionsareprecededby
neural activity, as discussed by Libet and by Haggard
and colleagues, it is currently unclear how these activa-
tions relate to the phenomenology of intention.
Haggard and others (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, &
Frith, 2002; Haggard, 2005) have argued that the
sense-of-agency that typically accompanies the execu-
tionofvoluntarymovementsarisesasaresultofinternal
forward sensory modelsthatgenerate a predictionofthe
sensory consequences of an action that is then matched
against afferent sensory signals. It has been proposed
that in cases where the link between these sensory pre-
dictions and confirmatory sensory input is broken, neu-
rological syndromes such as anosagnosia (lack of
awareness of injury) or somatoparaphrenia (denial of
limb ownership) may occur (Tsakiris, 2010).
Interestingly, both of these disorders have been linked
to damage of the anterior insular cortex of the right
hemisphere (Baier & Karnath, 2008; Karnath, Baier, &
Nagele, 2005). However, it is important to note that this
sense of agency may in fact have a significant postdic-
tive or reconstructive component (Moore, Lagnado,
Deal, & Haggard, 2009; Wegner, 2002) and thus is not
necessarily an unambiguous index of intentionality.
URGES-FOR-ACTION, TICS, AND
TOURETTE SYNDROME
Tics are involuntary, repetitive, stereotyped behaviors
that occur with a limited duration. Motor tics can be
simple or complex in appearance, ranging from repeti-
tive movements to coordinated action sequences
(Leckman, 2002). Verbal tics can consist of repeating
wordsorutterances(palilalia),producinginappropriate
or obscene utterances (coprolalia), or the repetition of
another’s words (echolalia).
Tics occur in bouts, typically many times in a single
day, and are the most common form of movement dis-
order in children, with a prevalence of 1–29% depending
upon the precise characteristics of the study population,
the diagnostic criteria used, and the study design and
methods employed (Leckman, 2002). Tics include a con-
tinuum of disorders: transient tic disorder (TTD), chronic
tic disorder (CTD), nonspecific tic disorder (NSTD), and
Tourette syndrome (TS). The etiology of tics is poorly
understood and probably involves a complex interaction
between genetic and environmental factors that exert an
influence over brain development.
TS is a developmental neuropsychiatric disorder
that lies at the extreme of the tic disorder spectrum
and is characterized by the presence of chronic vocal
and motor tics (Leckman, 2002). The neurological
basis of TS is unclear; however, it is agreed that the
basalganglia,includingcircuitsthatlinkthestriatumto
the frontal lobes, are dysfunctional (Albin & Mink,
2006). A specific model of basal ganglia dysregulation
in TS has been proposed as follows. Subsets of striatal
neurons (matrisomes) are thought to become abnor-
mally active in inappropriate contexts, leading to the
disinhibition of thalamocortical circuits that in turn
lead to tics. Activity-dependent dopamine inappropri-
ately reinforces such activity, leading to stereotyped
repetition of behavior (Albin & Mink, 2006). Brain-
imaging and postmortem studies provide general sup-
port for the view that cortical–striatal–thalamocortical
pathways are dysfunctional in TS (Gerard & Peterson,
2003). Furthermore, deep-brain stimulation of the glo-
bus pallidus or the thalamus has been shown to be
effective in suppressing tics in individuals with TS
(e.g., Ackermans et al., 2011).
The occurrence of repetitive, stereotypical beha-
viors in TS has been linked to operation of the brain
“reward” and “habit” systems, and tics have been
likened to an inappropriate overextension of habit
learning (Graybiel, 2008). Key characteristics of habi-
tual behaviors are that they are largely learnt, occur
repeatedly, are performed almost automatically, and
often involve stereotypical, ordered, action sequences
(Graybiel, 2008). In this context, it is important to note
that many individuals with TS report that their tics are
often preceded by “premonitory sensory phenomena”
(PSPs), which are described as the presence of uncom-
fortable cognitive or bodily sensations (e.g., tension,
pressure, tickle), that precede the execution of a tic,
and are experienced as a strong urge for motor dis-
charge (Banaschewki, Woerner, & Rothenberger,
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ceive a relatively constant demand to suppress their
tics in social situations, and while the voluntary sup-
pression of tics is possible in many cases, individuals
with TS nevertheless report that it can be uncomforta-
ble and stressful to suppress tics, and that the urgeto tic
becomes uncontrollable after a period of suppression.
It is therefore likely that some tics at least are learnt
motor or vocal behaviors that function to alleviate or
reduce uncomfortable bodily sensations.
Functional anatomy of tics in TS
Several attempts have been made to investigate the
brain regions associated with the occurrence of tics in
TS using human neuroimaging techniques. These stu-
dies have indicated that the neural mechanisms respon-
sible for triggering of tics may in fact differ from those
involved in voluntary movements (Bohlhalter et al.
2006). One notable study was that reported by Hallett
and colleagues, which used functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) to examine brain areas activated
immediately preceding the spontaneous occurrence of
motorand/or vocal tics, and thus likely to be associated
with the urge to tic (Bohlhalter et al., 2006). This study
identified a network of brain areas that were activated
immediately prior to tic onset, and, most importantly,
identified the insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, and the parietal operculum, which includes the
secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) (Eickhoff,
Amunts, Mohlberg, & Zilles, 2006), as the most likely
anatomicregionsresponsiblefortheuncomfortablefeel-
ings associated with premonitory urges to tic
(Bohlhalter et al., 2006). Consistent with this propo-
sal, electrical stimulation of the insular cortex or the
parietal operculum can elicit unpleasant somatosen-
sory or visceral sensations (Augustine, 1996;
Ostrowsky et al., 2002; Penfield & Faulk, 1955). By
contrast, electrical stimulation of the medial frontal
lobes produces motor outputs in the face and upper
limbs comparable to tics (Bancaud et al., 1976; Lim
et al., 1994; Talairach et al., 1973).
The proposal that the insular and cingulate cortices
are associated with the uncomfortable feelings asso-
ciated with the urge to tic in TS is consistent with the
putative role of these areas in the neural representation
of bodily states more generally (interoception), and the
initiation of behaviors associated with these bodily
representations (for reviews, see Craig, 2002, 2009;
Naqvi & Bechara, 2008). Thus, Craig suggests that
these two regions are linked functionally and can be
thoughtofasthelimbicsensoryandmotorareas.Hehas
proposed that these two areas form part of a functional
brain system that is associated with the awareness of
bodily states (particularly the right insular cortex) and
the maintenance of homeostasis (Craig, 2009; cf.
Damasio, 1999).
It is important to note that Craig’s particular view of
interoception includes a representation of all body
statesrelevanttohomeostasis,includingpain,tempera-
ture, taste, visceral sensation, inflammation, itch, and
manyaspectsoftouchandproprioceptionthatareoften
viewed as part of an “exteroceptive” somatosensory
system (Craig, 2003). Consistent with this view, recent
functionalbrain-imagingstudieshavedemonstratedthat
punctate somatosensory stimulation of the upper limbs
produces significant increases in brain activity––blood
oxygenlevel-dependent (BOLD) response)––bilaterally
within the insular cortex (e.g., Jackson, Parkinson,
Pears, & Nam, 2011; Parkinson et al., 2011). However,
neurophysiological studies suggest that the insular cor-
tex may play a particularly important role in represent-
ingtheemotionalsignificanceofsomatosensorysignals.
Thus, it has been shown that a neural pathway, consist-
ing of unmyelinated fibers, projects to the insula
(Olausson et al., 2002; Vallbo, Olausson, & Wessberg,
1999), and that these fibers are associated with affective
or sensual touch (e.g., pleasant touch sensation).
Brain-imaging and neurological studies also indicate
that the posterior and mid-insular cortex may play an
important role in body ownership and our sense of
agency (control) over our body. Thus, a positron emis-
sion tomography (PET) imaging study reported by
Tsakiris,Hesse,Boy,Haggard,andFink(2007)reported
that body ownership, as indexed by the strength of the
rubber hand illusion, was associated with activation
increases within the right posterior insula and right fron-
tal operculum. Similarly, Karnath and colleagues have
shownthatlesionsinvolvingtherightinsulaimpairbody
awareness, and the sense of limb ownership (e.g., Baier
& Karnath, 2008; Karnath, Baier, & Nagele, 2005).
Arguably, the most direct neuropsychological evi-
dence that the insular cortex is key to the experience of
urges for action comes from a study that investigated the
effect of insula lesions on the urge to smoke in those
addicted to smoking (Naqvi, Rudrauf, Damasio, &
Bechara, 2007). This study compared smokers who had
sustained damage involving the insula with a group of
smokers whose damage involved other brain areas, but
spared the insula. The study investigated changes in
smokingbehaviorpost-strokeanddemonstratedthatsmo-
kers whose brain damage involved the insula were sig-
nificantly more likely than smokers with lesions sparing
the insula to exhibit a “disruption of smoking addiction.”
Importantly, individuals described this disruption of
addiction as like their body “forgetting the urge to
smoke” (Naqvi et al., 2007).
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BRAIN-IMAGING STUDIES
Functional brain-imaging studies using fMRI have
become central to cognitive neuroscience; however, it
should be recognized that such studies have limita-
tions. Many of these are well known and relate to the
constraints imposed by hemodynamic signals
(Logothetis, 2008). A discussion of these limitations
is generally beyond the scope of this paper; however,
below, we briefly outline some issues that specifically
relate to difficulties in interpreting fMRI activations
associated with the urge to tic in individuals with TS.
First, one obvious difficulty associated with inter-
preting the meaning of the patterns of BOLD activity
reported in fMRI studies that have sought to identify
brain regions associated with the occurrence of tics in
TS, is that individuals with TS are instructed to remain
still in the MRI scanner and to suppress their tics. Thus,
the regions activated can reflect brain areas associated
with the generation of tics or brain areas linked to their
active suppression. Second, recent evidence suggests
that individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders
may follow unique developmental trajectories whereby
they undergo compensatory, neuroplastic changes in
brain structure and function that help them gain control
over their symptoms (Jackson, Parkinson, Jung, et al.,
2011). As a consequence, individuals with TS may
exhibit differences in functional anatomy, compared to
typically developing individuals, even when they are
performinganidenticalbehavioraltaskwithcomparable
levels of task performance. Third, the functional anat-
omy of the urge to tic in TS may differ from the func-
tional anatomy of other forms of the urge for action. In
fact, a related limitation of fMRI studies is that it is very
often difficult to carry out the range of control studies
that might be conducted when using non-imaging
experimental techniques. Finally, an important limita-
tion of individual fMRI studies is that it is very often
difficulttocompareacrossstudies.Thus,acomparisonof
individual fMRI studies of, for example, the urge to
urinate and the urge to swallow, might reveal differences
in functional anatomy because these behaviors have dif-
ferent underlying neural circuitry, or because of differ-
ences in the following factors: the behavioral paradigms
used, the scanner hardware and imaging protocols
adopted, analysis protocols and statistical thresholds, etc.
This last limitation can be overcome, however,
through the use of quantitative meta-analytic studies.
Such studies permit an estimation of the fMRI BOLD
responseassociatedwithdifferentbehaviors bydrawing
upon the entire body of published studies within a
particular behavioral domain. One method that has pro-
ven popular recently has been the activation likelihood
estimation (ALE) method developed by Turkeltaub,
Eden, Jones, and Zeffiro (2002) and modified by
Eickhoff and colleagues (Eickhoff et al., 2009).
A QUANTITATIVE META-ANALYTIC
COMPARISON OF THE URGE TO
MICTURATE AND THE URGE TO
SWALLOW
Here we report the use of the ALE method to directly
compare brain activity associated with the urge to
urinate (micturition) and the urge to swallow.
Study selection criteria
Functional neuroimaging studies were retrieved via
searches in the PubMed, ISI Web of Knowledge, and
Scopus databases, as well as identified by reference
tracing and through reviews. Experiments reported in
these papers that corresponded to the core behavioral
contrasts under consideration, such as contrast of urine
withholding against a resting baseline, urine voiding
againstbaseline,andvolitionalswallowingagainstbase-
line, were included in the meta-analyses if they fulfilled
thefollowingcriteria:analysesmustbecomputedacross
the whole brain and not restricted by partial coverage or
regions of interest analyses; coordinates must be
reported in an XYZ format, either in MNI or Talairach
space; only experiments that investigated differences
between stimulation conditions in healthy control popu-
lation were included; and experiments focusing on
between-group differences were excluded. No selection
wasmadeonthebasisoftheappliedstatisticalthreshold,
asallstudieswereobtainedfrompeer-reviewedjournals.
Additional methodological information is provided in
detail in the online supplementary material, available
via the ‘Supplementary’ tab on the article’s online page
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2011.604717).
Experiments investigating the functional anatomy of
swallowing were selected if they contrasted saliva swal-
lowing, water swallowing, overt swallowing, or covert
swallowing witha restconditionor other suitable control
condition.Experiments investigating thefunctionalanat-
omy of micturition were selected if they contrasted mic-
turition, urine withholding, bladder filling, or the urge to
void with a rest condition or other suitable control con-
dition. See Supplementary Material for further details.
The quantitative comparison of ALEs across studies
of swallowing revealed widespread clusters of activa-
tion that exceeded the conservative statistical threshold
(Figure2A).Theareasofcortexthatexceededthreshold
included primary motor cortex (BA 4), premotor cortex
232 JACKSON ETAL.(BA 6), frontal cortex (BA 9, 10, 44, 45), parietal cortex
(BA7,39,40),cingulatecortex(BA24,31),andinsular
cortex (BA 13). Subcortical activations included the
putamen,thalamus(ventralanteriornucleus), and claus-
trum. Quantitative comparison of ALEs across studies
of micturition also revealed widespread clusters of acti-
vation in both cortex and subcortical brain areas
(Figure 2B). Areas of cortex that exceeded threshold
included premotor cortex (BA 6), frontal cortex (BA
44), parietal cortex (BA 40), cingulate cortex (BA 24,
32), and insular cortex (BA 13). Subcortical activations
included the cerebellum, putamen, thalamus (medial
dorsal and ventral lateral nuclei), and claustrum.
To determine whether areas of overlap exist
between brain regions activated during swallowing,
or when individuals have an urge to swallow, and
regions activated when individuals urinate, or have an
urge to urinate, we carried out a conjunction analysis
between the swallowing and micturition ALE maps.
Thisanalysisconfirmed that,ofthewidespreadregions
activated in both studies, only two areas survived sta-
tistical comparison (p<.05): the insular cortex of the
right hemisphere and the mid-cingulate cortex bilater-
ally (Figure3). This finding isconsistent with theview,
outlined above, that the insular cortex, particularly the
right insula, may play an important role in the aware-
ness of bodily sensations, including behavioral urges.
Itisnoteworthythatthetwobehaviorschosenforstudy
here, swallowing and micturition, involve body areas
(i.e., the mouth and oropharyngeal area, and the blad-
der and genitals) that are located far from one another,
and have representations in primary sensorimotor cor-
tex that are also quite distinct and spatially separate.
An fMRI study of the urge to yawn
To further investigate this issue, we sought to investi-
gate the functional anatomy of the urge to yawn. As
there are insufficient neuroimaging studies currently
published to permit an ALE meta-analysis, we carried
out an fMRI study of the urge to yawn. Full methodo-
logical information is provided in detail in the online
supplementary material.
Figure 2. (A) Main results of an ALE meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of swallowing. This analysis revealed a number of activation foci
that survived conservative statistical correction (p<.05 corrected for false discoveryrate). Among thesewere activationswithin the insularcortex
andthedorsalmid-cingulatecortex.(B)MainresultsofanALEmeta-analysisofneuroimagingstudiesofmicturition.Againthisanalysisrevealed
statistically significant foci of activation within the insular cortex and the dorsal mid-cingulate cortex.
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sequence of video clips, each approximately 12 s in
length, which illustrated an actor yawning. These stimuli
had been previously shown to induce high levels of spon-
taneous yawning in a previous fMRI study (Schüermann
et al., 2005). In the current study, participants were
instructed to suppress their yawns (which they were able
to do successfully) but were required to report periods
during which they experienced a strong urge to yawn.
fMRI and anatomic data analysis
AnatomicimagesweretransformedintotheTalairach
coordinatesystemandco-registeredwitheachfMRIdata
set. Regional activation maps were obtained with a
single-subject GLM (general linear model) for eachindi-
vidual. We defined a single predictor that modeled the
periods that participants reported experiencing the urge
to yawn. All 10 individuals included in the analyses
reported successfully suppressing their yawns, and
inspection of the motion data confirmed this. Second-
level analyses involved calculating three-dimensional
statistical parametric maps with separate-subject predic-
tors for the group, using a random effects GLM (RFX).
TheresultingfMRIactivitymapswerethresholdedat aZ
value of 3.29 corresponding to p<.001
uncorrected with a
minimum cluster threshold of at least 20 voxels. The
results of this analysis revealed a number of statistically
significant clusters of activation. Details are provided in
Table 1.
Details of statistically significant fMRI BOLD acti-
vations associated with the urge to yawn are presented
inTable1andFigure4.Importantly,theanalysesofthe
fMRI BOLD response associated with participants’
subjective reports of their urge to yawn revealed that
both the cingulate motor area (CMA) and the insular
cortex bilaterally were activated when individuals
reported an urge to yawn.
To examine further whether the coordinates of the
yawning activations overlapped with the activation foci
observed for the ALE analyses of swallowing and mic-
turition reported above, we obtained ALEs for the peak
activationsoftheyawningCMAandinsulaactivationsso
thattheymightbecompareddirectlywiththeresultsofthe
Figure3. Theresultsofastatistical“conjunction”analysisbetweentheALEmeta-analysesofswallowingandmicturitionillustratedinFigure2.
The conjunction analysis revealed only two brain areas that reached statistical threshold: the insular cortex of the right hemisphere (RH) and the
mid-cingulate cortex (cingulate motor area) bilaterally.
234 JACKSON ETAL.ALEresultsforswallowingandmicturition.Furthermore,
wealsoobtainedALEsforthepeakactivationsassociated
with the urge to tic in individuals with TS reported by
Bohlhalter et al. (2006). These data are presented in
Figure5,whichillustratesthatallfourbehavioraldomains
overlap in the region of the mid-cingulate cortex and the
insular cortex of the right hemisphere.
Picard and Strick (2001) review the location and
functional anatomy of the motor areas located on the
medial surface of the human brain. In addition to iden-
tifying the supplementary motor area (SMA) and pre-
SMA, these authors identify three separable areas
within the human cingulate cortex: a caudal cingulate
zone (CCZ) situated ventral to the SMA, and a rostral
cingulate zone (RCZ) that is further subdivided into
anterior and posterior subregions. It is noteworthy that
the cingulate fMRI BOLD activations associated with
the urge for action in three everyday behaviors (i.e.,
swallowing, micturition, and yawning), and with the
urgetoticinTS,areeachlocatedinaregionofcingulate
cortex that corresponds closely to the CCZ. While the
RCZ is associated with conflict detection, attention and
arousal processes, and the selection of action, the CCZ
is, by contrast, associated with the execution of simple
movements and is also activated in response to bodily
stimulation such as the delivery of painful cutaneous
Figure 4. Regions exhibiting a statistically significant increase in blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal corresponding to the self-
reportedurgetoyawninan fMRI studyof yawning.Againthis analysisrevealedstatistically significantfociof activationwithin theinsularcortex
and the dorsal mid-cingulate cortex. CMA: cingulate motor area.
TABLE 1
Coordinatesforcenter-of-gravityandpeakactivationsforstatisticallysignificantclustersofactivationassociatedwiththeurgetoyawn
Location Mean X Mean Y Mean Z Peak X Peak Y Peak Z Voxels Z value p value
Right parietal cortex 51.2 -40.8 30.0 50 -32 33 2386 5.85 .00000
Right insular cortex 48.2 4.4 4.9 47 4 -3 3663 6.23 .00000
Cingulate cortex 0.25 -5.0 44.4 -11 -8 30 3361 6.86 .00000
Left parietal cortex -47.4 -43.5 29.6 -43 -44 27 1713 5.95 .00000
Left insular cortex -52.3 -7.4 14.5 -43 -20 24 3133 5.89 .00000
FUNCTIONAL ANATOMY OF URGE-FOR-ACTION 235heat and cold stimuli (Picard & Strick, 2001). It should
be noted that whereas the SMA has itself been linked to
the conscious intention to move (see Desmurget &
Sirigu, 2009), and while the CCZ and SMA may be
co-activated during movement execution, the SMA and
CCA should be considered functionally distinct from
one another (Picard & Strick, 2001).
EFFECTIVE CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN
INSULAR AND CINGULATE CORTICES
The insula and anterior cingulate cortex have been
considered to be the input and output regions of a
functional system that is engaged in cognitive, affec-
tive, and behavioral contexts (Craig, 2009; Medford &
Critchley, 2010). Consistent with this proposal there is
now considerable evidence that these regions are
jointly active across a wide range of experimental con-
ditions (for a recent review, see Medford & Critchley,
2010). In addition, functional connectivity analyses of
resting state fMRI BOLD, using seed regions located
within the insula, have shown that (1) the anterior
insula is connected functionally with the anterior and
mid-cingulate cortex; and (2) the mid- and posterior
regions of the insula are connected only with the pos-
terior region of the mid-cingulate cortex (Taylor,
Seminowicz, & Davis, 2009).
To investigate the effective, or directional, connec-
tivity of the anterior cingulate and insular cortices, we
used the Granger causality mapping (GCM) technique.
GCM implements a statistical concept of causality that
is based on temporal prediction. Unlike some other
methods used to examine effective connectivity,
GCM makes no a priori assumptions concerning the
connectivity of the seed region, but examines the asso-
ciation between the BOLD time course of the seed
region and the time course of each voxel outside the
seed region. In the current study, two reference or
“seed” regions were defined from the BOLD activa-
tions associated with theurge-to-yawn versus rest RFX
contrast referred to above. The first “seed” region was
locatedwithinthemid-cingulatecortex,andthesecond
withintheinsulacortexoftherighthemisphere(see the
online supplementary material for additional detail).
Figure5. RegionsofoverlapbetweenALEmeta-analyticstudiesofswallowingandmicturitionandfMRIstudiesoftheurgetoticinindividuals
with TS (Bohlhalter et al., 2006) and the urge to yawn in neurologically normal adults. Again these analyses reveal regions of overlap within the
insular cortex (CX) of the right hemisphere and the mid-cingulate cortex bilaterally.
236 JACKSON ETAL.The GCM analyses revealed a number of brain areas
with effective connectivity values that exceeded statis-
tical threshold (p<.001). The Talairach coordinates of
these areas are presented in Table 2. For the anterior
cingulate cortex seed region, the GCM analysis identi-
fiedfourbrainareasthatlikelyexertedaninfluenceover
the“seed”region.Theseweretheanteriorportionofthe
insular cortex in the left and right hemisphere, and the
anterior portion of the thalamus bilaterally. These
regionsareshowninblueinFigure6.TheGCManalysis
also identified four brain areas that were themselves
influenced by the “seed” region. These were the mid/
posterior region of the insular cortex in the left and right
hemisphere,andthecentromedialregionofthethalamus
bilaterally. These regions are shown in pink in Figure 6.
In addition to revealing patterns of effective connec-
tivitybetweenthethalamusandthecingulatemotorareas,
the GCM confirmed that the cingulate motor region is
influenced by the anterior portion of the insular cortex
(i.e., the BOLD response in the anterior insular cortex
predicts the BOLD response in the cingulate motor
region). This finding is entirely consistent with the view
of Craig (2002, 2009) that the insular and cingulate cor-
tices form the input and output regions of a functional
system, and can be characterized as the limbic sensory
and motor areas. Importantly, the GCM analysis con-
firms that the cingulate motor region also exerts an
influence over the activation of a different region of the
insular cortex; specifically the mid-insular cortex. This
can be clearly seen in Figure 6A, which illustrates
insular regions exerting an influence over the cingulate
motor region (blue) and being influenced by the cin-
gulate motor region (pink). Later in this paper, we
speculate on the likely functional significance of this
anterior insula ! cingulate ! mid-insular loop.
For the right hemisphere insular cortex seed region,
the GCM analysis identified four brain areas that likely
exerted an influence over the “seed” region (Table 2).
These were the anterior portion of the insular cortex in
the left hemisphere, the mid-portion of the cingulate
cortex (cingulate motor area), and the centromedial
portion of the thalamus bilaterally. These regions are
shown in blue in Figure 7. The GCM analysis also
identified four regions of the thalamus that were them-
selves influenced by the “seed” region. These were the
ventral lateral region of the thalamus bilaterally, and
the medial dorsal region of the thalamus bilaterally.
These regions are shown in pink in Figure 7.
TABLE 2
Results of GCM analysis of effective connectivity for mid-cingulate cortex and right hemisphere insula “seed” regions
Mean Talairach
coordinates
Seed area X Y Z Center-of-gravity in Talairach coordinates
Mid-cingulate cortex 0.25 -5.0 44.4 XY Z
Regions exerting an influence over the “seed” area
Left anterior insular cortex -30 20 7
Right anterior insular cortex 30 20 -2
Left thalamus: anterior region -9 -16 -2
Right thalamus: anterior region 12 -17 1
Regions influenced by the “seed” area
Left mid-insular cortex and inferior frontal lobe -55 8 2
Right mid-insular cortex and inferior frontal lobe 52 11 -2
Left thalamus: centromedial region -2 -47
Right thalamus: centromedial region 3 -46
Seed area X Y Z
Right insular cortex 48.2 4.4 4.9
Regions exerting an influence over the “seed” area
Left anterior insular cortex -42 8 5
Mid-cingulate cortex -13 4 4
Left thalamus: centromedial region -11 -19 5
Right thalamus: centromedial region 11 -17 5
Regions influenced by the “seed” area
Left thalamus: ventral lateral region -14 -14 16
Right thalamus: ventral lateral region 15 -11 17
Left thalamus: dorsal medial region -1 -17 9
Right thalamus: dorsal medial region 3 -17 8
FUNCTIONAL ANATOMY OF URGE-FOR-ACTION 237Figure 6. (A) Results of the effective connectivity analyses, based upon Granger causality mapping (GCM), of the yawning fMRI study. In this
case,the“seed”regionfortheGCMhasbeendefinedastheregionofthemid-cingulatecortexsignificantlyactivatedduringtheurgetoyawn.The
GCManalysisrevealedthatregionsoftheanteriorinsulabilaterallyexertasignificantinfluenceovertheseedregion(blue),whereasregionsofthe
mid-insula and inferior frontal lobe bilaterally are influenced by the seed area (pink). TRA: transverse; IFG: inferior frontal gyrus. (B) Further
results of the GCM analysis based upon the mid-cingulate “seed” region. The analysis also revealed that regions of the centromedial thalamus
bilaterally exert a significant influence over the seed region (blue), and bilateral regions of the anterior thalamus are influenced by the seed area
(pink). CMA: cingulate motor area.
238 JACKSON ETAL.Figure 7. (A) Results of the effective connectivity analyses, based upon Granger causality mapping (GCM), of the yawning fMRI study. In this
case, the “seed” region for the GCM has been defined as the region of the insular cortex of the right hemisphere that was significantly activated
during the urge to yawn. The GCM analysis revealed that corresponding regions of the insular cortex within the left hemisphere, and the mid-
cingulatecortexbilaterally,eachexertasignificantinfluenceovertheseedregion(blue).CMA:cingulatemotorarea;TRA:transverse.(B)Further
results of the GCM analysis based upon the right insula “seed” region. The analysis also revealed that regions of the centromedial thalamus
bilaterally exert a significant influence over the seed region (blue), and that bilateral regions of the ventral-lateral and dorsomedial thalamus are
influenced by the seed area (pink).
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effective connectivity revealed by the GCM analyses
do not necessarily reflect anatomic connections.
Nevertheless, the patterns of connectivity revealed by
the GCM are consistent with known anatomy and
function of specific thalamocortical connections. For
instance, the anterior thalamic nuclei receive their pri-
mary input from the hypothalamus, project to the cin-
gulate cortex, and are associated with visceral and
emotional processing. In the current study, the GCM
analysis confirms that the activity of the anterior thala-
mus exerts an influence over the cingulate cortex and
thus provides a route by which emotional and visceral
signals might influence the selection of motor
responses.
The centromedian nuclei of the thalamus are a pri-
mary source of thalamostriatal projections and play a
key role in motor function. In the current study, the
GCM analysesconfirm that the centromedian regionof
the thalamus is influenced by the activation of the
cingulate cortex but in turn exerts an influence over
the activity of the right insular cortex. This pattern of
connectivity suggests that motor processes in the cin-
gulate motor regions of cortex may gain influence over
motor selection mechanisms within the striatum via
their influence over the centromedial thalamus.
Furthermore, the centromedial thalamus may also sig-
nal outcomes of the motor selection process to the
insula. We speculate that the insular cortex may accu-
mulate evidence on the outcomes of the action, deter-
mine whether the conditions giving rise to the urge for
action have been resolved, and, if appropriate, generate
a sense that the urge for action has been satisfied (see
below). In the current context, it is of interest to note
that deep-brain stimulation (DBS) of the centromedian
region of the thalamus has been demonstrated to be an
effective treatment for intractable TS and produces a
substantial reduction in the occurrence of tics
(Ackermans et al., 2011).
The GCM analysis also revealed that theright hemi-
sphere insular cortex “seed” area is influenced by the
BOLD activation within the ventral lateral and dorsal
medial regions of the thalamus. The ventral lateral
nuclei of the thalamus receive their input from the
basal ganglia and cerebellum and send outputs to
motor regions of cortex. As illustrated in Figure 1, a
key aspect of the motivation-for-action model outlined
above is that information about the outcomes of motor
events is relayed to the limbic system, where it might
be usedto determine whetherthe conditions giving rise
to the urge for action have been resolved. The medial
dorsalthalamic nuclei areknown toreceivetheirinputs
primarily from prefrontal and limbic regions of cortex,
and project to association areas of the frontal lobe.
These nuclei have been associated with complex
aspects of cognition, including attentional control and
multitasking, goal-directed action planning, and learn-
ing and working memory.
A ROLE FOR INSULAR CORTEX IN
SENSORIMOTOR PREDICTION?
Our everyday movements often involve interactions
between our body and physical objects located within
our environment, and engage multiple sensorimotor
systems acting in concert. Action selection mechan-
isms must therefore take account of information about
the current state of the motor apparatus (our body) and
also of the behavior of objects within our immediate
environment. Recent computational neuroscience
approaches to the selection and control of movement
(e.g., Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000)
and to reinforcement learning (e.g., Dayan & Niv,
2008) have emphasized the importance of prediction
mechanisms to these processes.
It has been argued that efficient motor behavior
relies to a large extent upon predictive mechanisms
that provide accurate estimates, or “internal models,”
of the changing state of our body and the objects with
which we interact. Internal “forward” models are
thought to compute dynamic estimates of the body
stateandtopredictthesensoryconsequencesofactions
(Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). In this view, predic-
tion is necessary to compensate for delays associated
withtheprocessingofsensoryinformation,butafferent
sensory information is critically important for main-
taining the accuracy of internal models and is used to
monitor and correct for prediction errors, thereby
improving future prediction accuracy and movement
control. Thus, any discrepancies between the predicted
and observed consequences of an action are used to
increase or maintain the accuracy of forward models.
Reinforcement learning also involves the evaluation
of the outcomes that follow an action. Computational
models of reinforcement learning propose that learning
canbebaseduponinternalmodelsofthestatetransitions
and action outcomes within an environment, or based
upon model-free learning mechanisms (Dayan & Niv,
2008). Model-free reinforcement learning involves
learning to estimate or predict the likely outcome
(value or reward) of a given action (state) given an
appropriate action-selection policy. This kind of learn-
ing is associated with the formation of “habitual”
responses (Graybiel, 2008) and has been particularly
linked to the operation of the ventral striatum, the neu-
rotransmitter dopamine acting as a reinforcement signal
that codes for reward “prediction error” (Schultz,
240 JACKSON ETAL.Dayan, & Montague, 1997). By contrast, model-based
reinforcement learning has been associated with goal-
directedactioninwhichtheefficacyofcandidateactions
is evaluated with reference to an internal model of the
task or state space. A key concept associated with this
type of learning is that the selection of an appropriate
action may involve a “mental simulation” of potential
outcomes (Dayan & Niv, 2008). We suggest that the
formation of“urges-for-action” isprobablylinkedtothe
operation of the habit-learning system, whereas the for-
mation of “desires-for-action” is probably associated
with goal-directed, action-planning mechanisms.
A QUANTITATIVE META-ANALYSIS OF
REWARD PREDICTION
In this paper, we have speculated that the insular cortex
may accumulate evidence on the outcomes of an action
and determine whether the conditions giving rise to the
urge for action have been resolved. Within the compu-
tational framework offered by the forward model lit-
erature, this process might involve a comparison of a
“nextstateestimate”(theoutputofaforward“sensory”
model that provides an estimate of the sensory conse-
quences of a planned action) with afferent sensory
information that signals the sensory outcomes of the
executed action. Within the computational framework
offered by model-free reinforcement learning, this pro-
cesswouldinvolvepredictingorrepresentingthelikely
outcome (value or reward) of an action.
To examine whether the insular cortex plays a key
role in the representation of the reward estimates for
planned actions, we carried out an ALE meta-analysis
of functional brain-imaging studies that have investi-
gated the anticipation or expectation of rewards. Full
methodological information is provided in detail in the
online supplementary material.
Studies were initially chosen by the following key-
words: “reward,”“ prediction,”“ prediction error,”
“fMRI” and “prediction,”“ prediction error,”“ expecta-
tion,” and “anticipation.” The reward modalities used
in the studies reported here were monetary or pleasur-
able taste rewards. Studies were further refined accord-
ing to the following criteria.
First, events used in the fMRI contrasts should
occur prior to the onset of the reward to reflect the
outcome of anticipatory processes rather than the pro-
cesses in response to the actual receipt of a reward.
Second, the contrasts should reflect events in which
participants hold an expectation of reward versus a
control event such as the expectation of non-rewarding
stimuli, or the expectation of loss. The study might
include, however, contrasts of high reward probability
versus low reward probability. Thus, results that reveal
activations by association with the reward probability
were explicitly included in the analysis.
Third, participants should expect primary rewards
or secondary rewards. Studies that investigated the
prediction of non-rewarding events were excluded
fromthisanalysis.Asaresultoftheseselectioncriteria,
eight studies were included in the meta-analysis. Full
details of these studies are provided in the online sup-
plementary material.
The results of the ALE meta-analysis are illustrated
in Figure 8. They show that the following brain areas
were significantly activated for contrasts associated
with the prediction or expectation of rewards across
the set of fMRI studies included in the analysis: the left
ventral anterior insula cortex, the ventral striatum bilat-
erally, the globus pallidus bilaterally, and the dorsal
cingulate cortex.
The above analyses implicate the input and output
nuclei of the basal ganglia together with the anterior
insula and the dorsal cingulate cortex in the representa-
tion of reward estimates. These findings are consistent
with recent proposals that the basal ganglia nuclei
modulate movement execution according to motiva-
tional factors, specifically context-specific cost/reward
estimates (Turner & Desmurget, 2010); that the ante-
rior insular cortex may represent expectations of both
positive and negative action outcomes
(e.g., Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008); and
that the anterior cingulate cortex plays a fundamental
roleinrelatingactionstotheiroutcomes,andfunctions,
together with the ventral striatum, to mediate cost–
benefit decisions over the selection of action
(Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007;
Rushworth, Mars, & Summerfield, 2009; Rushworth,
Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004).
These findings are also consistent with the proposal
being advanced here thattheanterior insular cortexand
the dorsal cingulate motor areas, along with the ventral
striatum and thalamus, form core nodes in a
motivation-for-action system. Specifically, we propose
that pleasant or unpleasant somatosensory or visceral
sensations––for instance, the premonitionary sensa-
tions that precede the occurrence of tics in TS––are
represented within the SII, and in the posterior and
mid-insular cortex, and that these sensations will
often elicit habitual, overlearned, actions. We also pro-
pose that awareness of these bodily sensations, often
perceived as an urge for action, is associated more
specifically with the activity of the anterior insula
cortex. Signals associated with such bodily sensations
are relayed from the insula to cingulate motor areas
that, together with the ventral striatum, may participate
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benefit analysis of the likely “value” of an action given
the organism’s previous history of action outcomes.
Finally, as illustrated inFigure 9, we propose that an
estimate of the predicted sensory consequences (out-
come) of the selected action is then returned to the
insula and inferior frontal cortex, where it may be
used to determine whether the sensations giving rise
to the urge for action are predicted to alter as a result of
the intended action, and, if appropriate, to generate a
sense that the urge for action has been satisfied. This
last proposal is consistent with recent demonstrations
that signals from the cingulate motor area participate in
the attenuation of somatosensory activity in SII ahead
of voluntary movements (Parkinson et al., 2011). Such
sensory cancellation is thought to be a key function of
“forward models” (Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert &
Ghahramani, 2000), and it is suggested that the pre-
dicted sensory consequences of self-generated move-
ments can be attenuated in favor of unpredictable,
exafferent, somatosensory input (i.e., sensory signals
produced by the environment).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have begun to consider the nature and
thefunctionalanatomyof“urges-for-action,”bothinthe
context of everyday behaviors such as yawning, swal-
lowing, and micturition, and in relation to clinical dis-
orders such as TS, where urges-for-action are
considered pathological, and interfere with activities of
daily living. We began by reviewing previous frame-
works for thinking about behavioral urges, such as
Davenport, Sapienza, and Bolser’s (2002) motivation-
for-action framework that had been formulated in the
context of the urge to cough. While it contains several
important insights, we took the view that a core aspect
of this framework––that actions depend upon the con-
versionofanurge-for-actionintoaconsciousdesire-for-
action––was very likely incorrect. We felt that this was
particularly true in the case of individuals with TS, in
whom urges-for-action were associated with the occur-
rence of motor and vocal tics that the individuals found
both embarrassing and distressing. In this instance, it is
difficult to reconcile such actions with the notion that
Figure 8. Main results of an ALE meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of reward expectation (see the online supplementary material for
additional information). This analysis revealed a number of activation foci that survived conservative statistical correction (p<.05 corrected for
false discovery rate). Among these were activations within the insular cortex (A and C) and the dorsal mid-cingulate cortex (B).
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we took the view that such actions may be habitual, and
as such were highly overlearned and automatic, and
could in some cases be executed with very little or no
conscious awareness of the sensory stimulation that
triggered the action. Importantly, we distinguished
between reflex actions and the urge-for-action, which,
we argued, occurred when bodily signals gave rise to an
action that must be suppressed or deferred.
Then, using quantitative ALE meta-analytic techni-
ques, we investigated the functional anatomy of the
urge-for-action in the context of swallowing and mic-
turition, and demonstrated that brain activations asso-
ciatedwiththesebehaviorsoverlappedintworegionsof
the brain; the right insula and the dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex. Furthermore, we showed that functional
activations associated with the urge to tic in individuals
with TS and the urge to yawn in neurologically healthy
individuals alsooverlappedwithinthese sametwo brain
areas. These two areas have been conceptualized as the
limbic sensory and motor areas respectively (Craig,
2002, 2009), and based upon the effective connectivity
analyses of our yawning fMRI data, we proposed that
they are central in representing the urge-for-action, and
together form a neural circuit that represents bodily
sensations, generates an urge-for-action (which may or
may not reach awareness), selects a particular action
based upon a cost–benefit analysis of the likely
“value” of that action, accumulates evidence on the
outcomes of that action, determines whether the condi-
tions giving rise to the urge have been resolved, and, if
appropriate, generates a sense that the urge has been
satisfied. Finally, we argue that this circuit is anatomi-
cally separate and largely independent of the neural
system responsible for the preparation and execution
of intentional, goal-directed, actions, although it is pos-
sible that these systems may overlap partially with
respect to the sense of agency that accompanies inten-
tionalaction,whichhasbeenassociatedwiththeactivity
of the insular cortex of the right hemisphere.
Figure9. (A)GCMeffectiveconnectivityanalysesoffMRIBOLDactivationsofyawningrevealedareciprocalpatternofeffectiveconnectivity
between the anterior insula, the cingulate motor area, and the mid-insula. (B) On the likely function of these connections, we propose that the
anteriorinsulamayrepresenttheurge-for-action,thatthecingulatemotorregionmayparticipateintheselectionofanappropriateactionfollowing
a cost–benefit analysis based upon the organism’s past action–outcome history, and that the mid-insular cortex may evaluate, based upon a
prediction of the likely outcome of the selected action, whether the conditions giving rise to the urge have been resolved, and, if appropriate, may
generate a sense that the urge-for-action has been satisfied. CMA: cingulate motor area.
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Abstract: Besides sneezing, yawning, and scratching, other
types of more complex behaviors can be considered urges for
action, in that they are both compelling and can be overtly
inhibited. Many behaviors increasing the survival rate of self
and species have this instinctual (although not compulsory)
nature. We feel a terrible urgeto catch a newborn falling from
a table, although we could choose not to do so. The
hypothesis is advanced that both insula and cingulate cortex
participate in social behaviors such as contagious yawning,
laughing, and crying, but are not necessarily involved in the
urge to cough, for example.
Jackson and coauthors state that motor reflexes (as in
recoiling from fire) are different from urge-for-action
in that they cannot be cortically inhibited (or tempo-
rally postponed). They also characterize urges for
actions as different from desires because of their highly
implicit and not overly conscious nature. These char-
acterizations are insightful and correct in principle, but
the authors focus on very specific and peculiar urge-
for-action types, such as the urge of urination, and of
yawning and scratching, which are far from
homogeneous.
The urge to urinate is one of the many signals that
originate in the brain upon hypothalamic impulses and
that are involved in the homeostatic regulation of phy-
siological parameters (such as blood oxygen, delta
sleep-inducing peptide levels, and plasma concentra-
tion of glucose (Burdakov, Luckman, & Verkhratsky,
2005).In this view, the urgetoeat ina person withvery
low glucose levels cannot be considered a reflex (it can
be cortically guided, inhibited, or deferred) and is not
necessarily a conscious desire (e.g., as with someone
who is working and is very concentrated); therefore, it
can be legitimately considered an urge-for-action.
Similarly, the urge to breathe when there is a lack of
oxygen (at high altitude, or in badly air-conditioned
places), or, again, the urge to lie down when cerebral
blood pressure is low and we feel faint; the urge to
quickly undress when it is too hot, or to wrap up when
it is freezing; the urge to move arms and legs when we
are drowning; and the urge to cough if we are suffocat-
ing can all legitimately be considered types of urges-
for-action.
We are not sure that insula and mid-cingulate cortex
are crucially involved in all these behaviors. It is pos-
sible that contagious yawning might share more simi-
larities with other human behaviors reflecting the
processing of social information (such as contagious
crying and laughing). Indeed, we know that both insula
and cingulate cortex play a very important role in
empathy, in response to crying (Lang, Yu, Markl, Mü
& Kotchoubey, 2011; Sander, Frome, & Scheich,
2007) or to the sight of suffering people (Proverbio,
Adorni,Zani,&Trestianu,2009).Possibly,thesestruc-
tures are responsible forother urges-for-actions such as
those regulating instinctual parental behavior (catching
a baby falling from a table, for example), aimed at
increasing the survival rate of individuals (brushing
an insect away from a child) or of the species.
Finally, I would make a distinction between spon-
taneous yawning and contagious yawning.
Spontaneous yawning is thought to have the impor-
tant function of increasing oxygen blood levels, by
expanding the lungs and stretching the muscles
(Thompson, 2011). It is also known to lower brain
temperature, thus favoring increase in sleepiness and
passage to the sleep stage (Gallup & Gallup, 2007).
Overall, yawning is probably involved in the circa-
dian and homeostatic control of sleep and wakeful-
ness. Contagious yawning, on the other hand, is
thought to be based on the activity of mirror neurons,
with the purpose of synchronizing and regulating the
behavior of cohabitant individuals, similarly to con-
tagiouslaughingandcrying(Geangu,Benga,Stahl,&
Striano, 2010). In this view, the urge to yawn when
another does so would stimulate regions involved in
theory of mind and empathy, such as the cingulate
cortex (Platek, Mohamed, & Gallup, 2005), as was
found by Jackson and coauthors.
***
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Abstract: Investigations into the neurobiological substrates
underlying urge are important for developing better
understanding and treatment for impulse-control disorders.
We characterize the phenomenon based on normal bodily
(interoceptive) urges. Features include the following: a
preceding awareness of an uncomfortable bodily sensation,
a sense of urgency that action must be taken, rising distress
when action is delayed, a temporary (e.g., a few minutes in
length) ability to suppress or manifest the action voluntarily,
subsequent relief once action is taken, association with an
action that is necessary to survival. We compare and contrast
these characteristics with those described by Tourette
syndrome patients as the urge to tic, and highlight several
unknowns which merit further investigation.
Understanding the anatomical and physiological basis
of “urges” is important not only because they occur in
disease states, such as Tourette syndrome, but also
because they are closely related to impulses that,
when uncontrolled, can wreak havoc on individuals
and societies. Problems with impulse control include
substance abuse, domestic violence, sexual deviancy,
and pathological gambling. In this context, it is impor-
tant to clearly define what is meant by “urge,” to
delineate what distinguishes normal from pathological
urges, and to clarify how urges differ from other modes
of action selection. Study of the underlying functional
anatomy,asreviewed byJacksonetal.,canthenlead to
a greater understanding and better treatment of
impulse-control disorders.
The elementary components of brain function can
be divided into sensory input, processing, and motor
output. Urge is one mode of processing. Although it
exists within a continuum of modes including reflex,
desire, and intention, in which boundaries are some-
what artificial, defining the phenomenon helps unify
research efforts. Sensory input that leads to urge can
come from within the body (interoceptive) or from
outside the body (exteroceptive). We characterize
urge based on examples of common bodily urges: to
urinate, yawn,cough,blink,andsleep. Ineach,sensory
input can trigger the action out of awareness, in which
case there is no urge and the action is perceived as
occurring involuntarily. If, however, the action is
delayed, the sensation reaches awareness and the urge
to act develops. Urge is separate from the sensation.
Thesensationthatourbladderisfullisdistinctfromthe
need (urge) to empty it. Bodily sensations that trigger
urge are uncomfortable and, as they mount in intensity,
lead to a feeling of distress. This is probably because
the actions to which urges lead are those that are
essential to our survival. During a brief period, we
can control the action by either suppressing it or
executing it, but at some point it occurs without our
will. In this way, the actions driven by urges are neither
truly involuntary nor truly voluntary. Because of the
short time frame in which action must be taken, there is
a sense of urgency with urge, differentiating it from
desire. Once the action is taken, the sensation is elimi-
nated and there is an experience of relief.
In many ways, Tourette patients experience a paral-
lel series of events (Bliss, 1980). Their tics can occur
completely out of awareness, and, in these instances,
would be described as involuntary. Often, however,
patients describe an uncomfortable bodily sensation
that triggers the urge to tic: a feeling that the action
must be done. When tics are suppressed, the sensation
and urge increase in intensity, leading to mounting
distress. Patients state that they voluntarily make tics
occur in response to the urge (Lang, 1990), causing a
reduction in the bothersome sensation and a feeling of
relief. With prolonged suppression, the urge becomes
overwhelming and tics occur beyond patients’ control.
Thus, tics reside in that gray zone between involuntary
and voluntary, and have been called “un-voluntary.”
However, there are some key distinctions between
normal interoception-related urges and those associated
with tics.First, we do not yetknow what type of sensory
input generates the uncomfortable bodily sensations that
trigger the urge to tic. Although patients sometimes
describe these sensations as coming from muscles or
joints, it has never been demonstrated experimentally
that sensory activity initiated in the periphery is the
origin of their sensory experience. Second, tics are not
keytosurvival.Itisanimportantaspectofthepathology
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tress in relation to actions that are not only nonessential
but also nonproductive. We do not yet understand when
or how this association is made. Third, following the tic,
the bothersome sensation is not eliminated, but only
reduced in intensity. Finally it is not clear why tics
mustbeperformedinaparticularwayinordertoachieve
relief and diminishment of the bothersome sensations.
Continued research into the circuitry that mediates both
normal and pathological urges, as described by Jackson
et al., will help our understanding and treatment of
Tourette syndrome and other impulse-control disorders.
Features of normal and tic-related urges
Characteristic Normal Tic
Sensory input from bodily organs Yes ?
Sensation reaches awareness when action delayed Yes Yes
Sensation is uncomfortable Yes Yes
Experience urgency and need to take action Yes Yes
Action can be suppressed (minutes), and then must
occur
Yes Yes
Relief from discomfort with action taken Yes Some
Action is necessary to organism survival Yes No
***
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Abstract: A neuroanatomical model of urge-for-action
phenomena has been proposed based on the “motivation-
for-action” network (e.g., insula and mid-cingulate cortex).
Notwithstanding the sound evidence presented regarding the
functional and anatomical correlates of this model, the nature
of the relationship between urges and conscious awareness
remains to be addressed. Moreover, this model does not seem
to explain (1) how a conscious access threshold is reached,
and (2) the way in whichthe urgesare related to more general
contents of consciousness.
Jacksonetal.haveproposedanovel model ofurge-for-
action. This model considers the nature and functional
anatomy ofurge-for-actioninthecontextofnormallife
and clinical disorders. Through a meta-analysis, the
authors show that there is an overlap between limbic
sensory and motor neural circuits related to urges of
everyday behaviors such as swallowing and tics in
Tourette syndrome. The primary merit of this work is
unquestionable; the authors propose an empirical and
theoretical model of urge-for-action incorporating
actions that do not necessarily require conscious
awareness of the sensory stimulation that triggered
them. Nevertheless, there are important issues that
this model does not explicitly incorporate.
First, it is not clear how urge-for-action, as defined
in this paper, can be a fully unconscious phenomenon.
If the momentary inhibition of the action is an integral
part of the definition of these urges, then that inhibition
should be unconscious as well. In this paper, we find a
lack of evidence on this topic, perhaps reflecting more
than a mere lack of interest on this matter. Having
searched the literature on unconscious inhibition of
action, we found several instances in which willed
intention is involved (e.g., go/no go tests in Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 2002, and van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van
denWildenberg,&Lamme,2009).Itishardtoimagine
a fully unconscious inhibition of the kinds of actions
considered to be representative of urge-for-action
(coughing, swallowing, yawning, etc.). As long as
that inhibition plays an important role in this process,
we should be consciously aware of our urge-for-action
as opposed to our reflexes.
Thesecondissueconcernsthenatureoftherelation-
ship between urges and conscious awareness. Jackson
et al. explained that the intensity of physiological affer-
ent stimulation relates directly to the awareness of the
urge’s strength during a phenomenon such as swallow-
ing, but it is not clear how this phenomenon could be
explained by their proposed model.
Despite the straightforward relationship between
insular cortex and interoceptive conscious awareness
(e.g., Ibáñez, Gleichgerrcht, & Manes, 2010), this fact
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neuronal activity of the cortical and subcortical regions
considered in this model. More importantly, even if we
consider that urge-for-action could be an unconscious
phenomenon, it remains unclear how this model could
explain the transition between urges the subject is not
conscious of and those of which the subject is con-
sciously aware. Along these lines, is it the strength of
activation of the right insular cortex, the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC), or the circuit between these
regions that is responsible for setting the threshold
between unconscious and conscious awareness of
urges? This point is far from being addressed in
Jackson et al.’s model.
Finally, how could the urge-for-action model of
Jackson et al. be integrated with more general models
of consciousness? Current models have determined the
activation of widespread cortical regions during goal-
directed visual awareness (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001)
and have specified some neuronal markersfor reaching
the threshold of conscious perception (e.g., Del Cul,
Baillet, & Dehaene, 2007). How does this urge-for-
action circuit interact with more general circuits of
conscious perception? Interoceptive awareness is con-
ceptualized as the capacity of being aware of some
specific content of consciousness; that is, of visceral
perception (Ibáñez et al., 2010). Therefore, the authors
should clarify the way in which interoceptive aware-
ness might be related to other contents of conscious-
ness, such as goal-directed cortical circuits underlying
more general conscious perception phenomena.
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Abstract: It is constitutive of the notion of an urge that it
mustprecedetheactioniturges.Forthedurationofanurgeto
be non-zero, some process must keep the action being urged
in check. Urges therefore inevitably involve inhibition of
action, and perhaps conflict between action and inaction. In
any event, they cannot form a critical part of the
phenomenology that many argue must precede voluntary
action, for if they play any part at all, it is only in situations
where the action is to some degree inhibited.
The notion of “urge” has come to play a pivotal role
incurrentconceptionsofvoluntaryaction.Curiously,it
hasdonesowithoutdetailedexplorationofthekinds of
actions––involuntary or atypically voluntary––where
the need to invoke it is arguably much greater, and
where an understanding of its neural basis is far more
plausibly within reach. And when one analyzes such
actions––as Jackson and his colleagues lucidly and
comprehensively do––the notion of urge that emerges
is radically at odds with one that gives it a critical role
in voluntary action. This is just as important a conclu-
sion as the independent clarification of the neural sub-
strate of urges itself.
It is surely right that urges must be dissociated from
the sensations that in some cases prompt them. The
urge to yawn, for example, is not plausibly any kind of
sensation: One can only describe it with reference to
theactionitcompels.What isminimallyconstitutive of
the notion of an urge is that it is an urge to do some-
thing: it is both transitive and directed at a specific
action. It is also true, as Jackson and his colleagues
point out, that an urge must temporally precede the
action: If it post-cedes it, we would not call it an urge,
and if it parallels it in time, then it could not be an urge
to perform the action because the action is already
being performed. But the implication goes further.
Since the urge is to perform the action, the necessary
intervalbetweenitandtheactionduringwhichtheurge
isexperienced mustinvolveinhibitionoftheaction,for
otherwise the action would be performed immediately.
Inhibition is therefore an inevitable consequence of the
notion of an urge.
Indeed, it is striking that the actions commonly
associated with urges––both in the normal and in the
pathological state––are usually of the kind that cannot
be actively chosen but only withheld. One cannot
actively choose to yawn or sneeze, and if one coughs
or voids one’s bladder voluntarily one tends to do so
pre-emptively of the normal action. To the extent to
which we have control over such actions, it is to keep
them in check, to be released at the time when their
performance is convenient. There are, of course, other
comparably “automatic” actions, such as blinking,
where urges play a much less prominent role, but it is
notable that they tend to be of a kind one rarely has
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urges in movement disorders such as Gilles de la
Tourette syndrome are perceived as unwanted; where
no such strong perception exists––in many cases of
chorea, for example––patients do not complain of
urges.
An urge to act, then, cannot be empirically disso-
ciatedfromtheinhibitionoftheaction,andpresumably
also from the conflict between action and inaction: this
is so not because we lack the experimental tools but
because inhibition is constitutive of the notion of an
urge. This implies that the neural substrate Jackson and
his colleague identify must also subserve these pro-
cesses. More importantly, it casts further doubt on the
notionthatanurgeisasignatureofthephenomenology
that is argued to precede voluntary action and to take
part in its self-ascription. For if an urge signifies the
inhibitionofanaction,itcanhardlybethoughtofasthe
“idea”drivingit.Thisalsoexplainswhyurgesareoften
reported during macrostimulation of the dorsomedial
frontalcortex:Thesetofmultipleneuronalpoolsinevi-
tably severally activated at that scale of stimulation is
bound to contain units that inhibit as well as drive
active movement.
There are, of course, numerous unanswerable argu-
ments against the ideomotor theories of action popu-
larized by Libet’s work, but keeping the lid on that
coffin is so extraordinarily difficult another nail can
never go amiss.
***
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Abstract: The model put forward for the neuroanatomical
basis of urges-for-action is compelling. The arguments based
on meta-analyses of existing neuroimaging data are elegant and
convincing. However, I am not convinced by the suggestion
that there are conscious urges and urges that remain unaware.In
my view, awareness is a defining feature of an urge.
Jackson et al. develop a convincing case for the exis-
tence of a neuroanatomical system that is responsible
for the “urge-for-action.” The role of the (right) insula
and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is inferred on
the basis of a number of separate meta-analyses look-
ing at associated brain activations in response to spe-
cific stimulation––in this case different triggers of
urges. The idea that there are separate systems for
“willed” or planned actions and “urged” actions
makes sense and is clearly supported by the clinical
and neuroimaging data.
The definition of “urges-for-action” proves more
complicated. The beginning is relatively straightfor-
ward. These urges involve a limited set of actions that
are habitual, standardized routines, such as scratching,
yawning, or swallowing. They typically do not require
feedback, and they are functional in that they alleviate
specific negative or unpleasant bodily states. Things
become tricky when we are offered the suggestion that
we have conscious and unconscious urges (cf.
Dijkerman & De Haan, 2007). We are told that urges
and desires are not synonymous, and the main reason
for this is that urges may also remain unaware to the
person who “experiences” them. Indeed, we may find
ourselvesswallowing or yawning without having had a
conscious urge, but it is not clear to me why this
behavior cannot be classified as “reflexive.” Indeed,
the Davenport, Sapienza, and Bolser (2002) study
seems to indicate that we are dealing with a system
where the intensity of the (negative) stimulation is
directly related to strength of the perceived urge. This
makes sense, the limbic system including the insula,
registers the amount of bodily discomfort, and depend-
ing on the severity of this discomfort, a more or less
“urgent” urge is felt.
I also agree with the authors that what distinguishes
a reflex from an urge is the fact that a reflex––by
definition––is immediate and proceeds without con-
scious interference. An urge, however, may need to
be postponed as the execution of the required action
is socially or emotionally compromising. Here I would
like to suggest a different interpretation from the one
put forward by Jackson et al. that an urge may be
construed as an interrupted reflex. The reflex entails a
complex sequence of detecting a specific negative
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action. The fact that this motor action is not socially
or emotionally acceptable is in essence culturally
defined, and therefore, is a learned response.
Thus, and this is my central thesis, the defining
aspect of an urge is a learned interruption of a reflexive
sequence. The result of this interruption is a conscious
awareness of the pending action and the fact that this
action is not acceptable in the current situation. In this
view, an unconscious urge is a contradiction in terms,
as an urge constitutes the awareness of the desire to
perform an action coupled with the learned response to
inhibit this action.
Jacksonetal.statethatitis“difficulttoreconcilethe
concept of a ‘desire,’ which is often defined as ‘a
longing or craving for something that brings satisfac-
tion or enjoyment,’ with unwanted actions, the execu-
tion of which is experienced as unpleasant and
distressing” (p. 229). I find this surprising and I cannot
subscribe to this “difficulty” felt by the authors, as in
my experience this is often exactly what patients with
obsessive compulsive disorder or Gilles de la Tourette
syndrome report. The simultaneous experience of the
urge to carry out an action and the concurrent realiza-
tion that this is not acceptable, socially or emotionally,
could be posited as the hallmark of obsessive compul-
sive disorder. In fact, after the act has been performed,
there is again a simultaneous experience but now
one of relief (because the act has––somewhat––alle-
viated the negative bodily state) and shame (because
the executed act was socially or emotionally unac-
ceptable). Interestingly, when I was reading the arti-
cle for the first time, I thought that, toward the end,
the authors would propose a role for the right insula
in becoming aware of an urge. They did not do so,
and I am glad they did not, because it is not impor-
tant for their main conclusion.
This review provides strong evidence for a sepa-
rate network in the brain involved in the detection of
well-defined negative bodily states and a set of habi-
tual, standardized routines to alleviate the discom-
fort. When the required action is consciously flagged
because of learned associations with negative social
or emotional connotations, the execution of these
actions is–– temporarily––inhibited, and an “urge”
is experienced.
***
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Abstract: Despite the fact that premonitory urges precede
most tics in patients with Gilles de la Tourette syndrome
(GTS), the voluntariness of tic elicitation and its
suppressibility as a response to these urges still remains
unclear. Moreover, there are no systematic studies
examining the association between urge intensity and the
ability to suppress tics. As shown by behavioral,
neurophysiological, and imaging data, sensorimotor
networks in GTS exhibit altered patterns of organization
modulated through interactions with frontomesial networks
of volitional inhibition.
In their nice and elaborated review, Jackson et al. pro-
vide a functional basis for a distinction between reflex-
ive behaviors and actions that come from urges helpful
in daily life (such as the urge to yawn, urinate, and
cough) and those possibly interfering with daily life
(such as the urge to tic). They argue that the latter are
associated with unwanted actions, principally as their
interoceptive gatekeepers, allowing their conscious
suppression or deferment. Particularly for Gilles de la
Tourette syndrome (GTS), they propose that premoni-
tory sensations are represented within the somatosen-
sory (SII) and mid- and posterior insular cortices,
leading to habitual actions. They argue that the urge
for action is associated with activity of the anterior
insular cortex, which is then relayed to the cingulum
and the ventral striatum for reward-based prediction
analysis, and then forwarded again to the insular and
inferior frontal cortices, which in their turn satisfy or
propagate the urge for action.
Examining the properties of the urge in GTS, and
already before Leckmann’s seminal paper (Leckmann,
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ician and GTS patient himself, published (Bliss, 1980)
a thorough description of his own premonitory sensa-
tions and, as a result, argued for the voluntariness of
tics. In the following years, systematic studies showed
that more than 90% of patients with GTS report these
urges and consider tics as, if at all, only partial invo-
luntary. It has been consistently found that the devel-
opment of the urge is reported with a lag of about 3
years after the onset of tics (Banashewski, Woerner, &
Rothenberger, 2003; Kwak, Dat Vuong, & Jankovic,
2003; Leckmann et al., 1993). The delayed appearance
of this phenomenonhas ledto aseriesof hypotheses: Is
the association of urges and tics a compensatory evolu-
tionary development as a basis for the option to sup-
press these phenomena, or are urges and tic
suppressibility co-existing phenomena, as suggested
by recent tic-suppression studies? (Banashewski
et al., 2003; Conelea & Woods, 2008).
As for the neurophysiology of tic generation, the
zeitgeist led to the study of the correlates of the volun-
tariness of movement disorders, with the pioneering
work of Obeso, Rothwell, and Marsden (1981), fol-
lowed 14 years later by another work (Karp, Porter,
Toro, & Hallett, 1996), which examined the presence
of the Bereitschaftspotential (BP) in tics. The results
were equivocal, with the first study showing that tics
were not preceded by the BP, and the second demon-
strating its presence in 2 out of 5 patients. This led to
the hypothesis (Kwak et al., 2003) that only tics asso-
ciated with a premonitory sensation––and therefore
consciously perceived and voluntarily initiated––are
preceded by the BP. This has been shown in three
patients in the only study to date that addressed this
question (Duggal & Nizamie, 2002). Additionally, and
in accordance with the latter study, which, surprisingly,
found a shorter than normal BP, Moretto showed that
patients with GTS have a delayed experience of voli-
tion (Moretto, Schwingenschuh, Katschnig, Bhatia, &
Haggard, 2011). This would imply that not only the
formation of tics but also the formation of normal
movements would necessitate an altered pattern of
motor organization through fronto-striato-thalamo-
cortical pathways, as supported by current findings
(Heise et al., 2010; Roessner et al., 2011).
Furthermore, in the absence of direct evidence to sup-
port the notion that the awareness of urges correlates
positively with the ability to suppress tics––a suppres-
sion, which, according to Jackson et al., would lead to
the propagation of theurgeand further activation of the
anterior insula––the role of frontomesial networks of
volitional inhibition (Kühn, Haggard, & Brass, 2009)
and tic suppression has to be addressed in detail. These
networks presumably influence the pre-supplementary
motor area activity in a top-down fashion, as supported
by a recent EEG experiment showing elevated inter-
regional interactions between these and sensorimotor
and prefrontal areas during tic inhibition, paralleled by
an increasing urge to tic (Serrien, Orth, Evans, Lees, &
Brown, 2005).
***
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Abstract: There is no doubt that there exist urges to act, but
are these really the cause of the action or is an urge a
shorthand term to describe the effort involved in
suppressing an action that is triggered automatically by
some other process?
There is no doubt that there exist urges to action–– just
think back to Zidane’s uncontrolled and badly timed
urge to head-butt an opponent. But can we go quite as
far as Jackson and colleagues in believing that they all
arise from activity in the same anterior insular and
caudal cingulate regions of the cortex? Furthermore,
does activity in these regions then drive the premoni-
tory sensations that are sometimes described by
patients with Tourette’s syndrome prior to their tics?
The argument of Jackson and colleagues is erudite and
informed,butthereseemstobeacertainsleightofhand
in the logical steps of the argument which lead to the
definition of a “motivation for action” network.
The authors begin with the highly reasonable asser-
tion that an urge to act is, at least in the majority of
instances, an awareness of the effort involved in
restraining the act. That is, some other factor (perhaps
only dimly perceived) is the trigger for this latent
action, and when we become aware of the impending
250 COMMENTARIESaction, we are able to prevent it from being released by
effort of will. Effectively, this seems to be saying that
stimulus–response associations exist that can give rise
to actions. Consistent with this idea, the authors point
out that some actions that can be associated with
urges on one occasion (e.g., yawning) can, on another
occasion, emerge without the sensation of an urge. The
rule seems to be that if the stimulus or impending
action is perceived before the action occurs, and if the
action is subsequently withheld, then we experience an
urgetoact(unlessthestimulusdisappears).Wecanfeel
an itch or a “desire” to scratch and we can decide to
withhold the scratch; if the itch persists, then we may
developanurgetoscratch.Paradoxically,anurgetoact
turns out to be an intention to suppress. The action
itself is triggered by some other factor in an automatic
fashion.
This seems to be a very simple and reasonable
interpretation that involves two interacting processes:
the basic stimulus–response coupling and a supervi-
sory system with a power to withhold the response.
However, the authors then seem to pursue quite a
different interpretation about halfway through the arti-
cle. The turning point comes after the analysis of the
first set of imaging data. Here they find common
activationinanteriorinsulaandcaudal cingulate cortex
during yawning and micturition. They then say that
activity in these common areas is responsible for the
urge to act and then causes the action, as illustrated in
Figure 9. At this stage, we have lost the low-level
stimulus–response coupling and all mention of inhibi-
tion. We are now told that inputs to the anterior insula
produce an urge to act (not to suppress a prepotent
action). This constitutes a feeling that we have to
make a particular movement, which is then achieved
via activation of caudal cingulate cortex.
We accept that it is difficult to decide which of these
interpretations is true. What strikes us as odd is that the
authors begin by emphasizing the importance of inhibi-
tion,yetendbytalkingaboutmotivationtoact.Wouldit
not be simpler to suppose that stimulus–response asso-
ciations exist at all levels of the sensorimotor system
from spinal reflexes to striatal habits. These are all to a
greater or lesser extent modifiable by a supervisory
system we may equate with volitional control. An urge
to act is an expression of the interaction between these
systems, not a separate system itself.
***
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